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This article sets out to shed light on the Lacanian concept of cut
(introduced in 1961–1962): it refers to the symbolic (i.e., linguistic) operation which
produces the object a and thereby enables separation, through which the subject
emerges. To that effect, we show how this concept benefitted from Lacan’s interactions
with Maud Mannoni (1923-1998), who focused on clinical situations where implementing
a cut in the subject’s environment is the only way to enable a separation between the
child and the Other. Lacan first drew on Mannoni’s clinical elaborations about the
retarded child’s alienation to the maternal fantasy: when the mother’s unconscious
doesn’t leave room for the cut, it prevents the separation through which the child
could become a subject. Lacan generalized this in the late 1960s: he broadened
Mannoni’s alienation to the maternal fantasy to characterize a type of child symptom,
where children become their mother’s non-separated, de-phallicized object a. Then,
in the 1970s, Mannoni proposed an original theoretico-clinical setting to address the
configurations where the object a isn’t separated: in the splintered institution, the team
follows on projects of activities (professional, personal, etc.) outside the institution voiced
by children who haven’t previously encountered the symbolic cut, by helping them
realize these external projects. By thus acknowledging their attempts at establishing
a cut and giving them consistency, the splintered institution helps them psychically
elaborate separation.
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INTRODUCTION
Lacan introduced the notion of cut in the early 1960s: its refers to the operation (broader
than castration, both in scope and in nature) through which the infant’s mothering figure (the
maternal or primordial Other) enables psychical separation, by introducing the infant to a
representation of him as symbolically distinct from her. Receiving this representation enables the
infant to ultimately acknowledge his separation from her body; in Lacan’s view, only then does the
infant become a subject.
In this paper, we shed light on the theoretical and clinical fruitfulness of this concept of cut
by addressing it from a specific perspective: that of the cases where the paradigm representation
enabling the cut—the Name-of-the-Father, Lacan’s rewriting of the Oedipus complex—isn’t
transmitted to the infant, thereby precluding the cut to be established in the child’s psyche. How
should one characterize such cases? Our hypothesis is that MaudMannoni’s clinical and theoretical
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elaborations on the psychotic dimension of such cases, which
took place in a constant exchange with Lacan, provided him with
crucial clinical material to conceptualize such situations and give
the concept of cut its final shape. In return, she used Lacan’s
concept of cut in a very original fashion, by putting together a
new type of institution trying to enable the emergence of the cut
within the unconscious of children not heretofore presented with
the Name-of-the-Father, by providing them with representations
to implement the cut according to their structure (neurotic,
psychotic, perverse, or autistic).
We first lay out the concept of cut as Lacan established
it in the early 1960s, and insist on its paradigm condition—
the Name-of-the-Father. We then show how Lacan first drew
on Mannoni’s clinical elaborations about the retarded child’s
alienation to the maternal fantasy: when this fantasy doesn’t leave
room for a paternal cut, it prevents the separation through which
the child could become a subject. He expanded on this in the late
1960s, in the first “Note on the Child:” the child can come to
embody the object of the maternal fantasy and thereby become
the mother’s non-separated, de-phallicized object a—which these
cases help characterize. Finally, we show how Mannoni, in the
1970s, proposed an original theoretico-clinical setting to address
the configurations where the cut hasn’t been implemented due
to a lack of paternal metaphor, and the object a therefore hasn’t
been separated. The splintered institution is a therapeutic setting
which assumes the cut by taking up desires of outside projects
expressed by its young hosts: children are accompanied outside
to participate in projects wherein they identify with a different
representation of themselves, and thereby experience themselves
as separated.
THE CUT ACCORDING TO LACAN, IN THE
EARLY 1960S
Alienation, A Precondition to the Cut
The Lacanian concept of cut, or better the “function of the
cut” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 206), refers to a structural sequence: it is
not an event taking place at a determinate time in individual
development, but a logical moment in the constitution of the
subject. It is the result of the encounter between a real infant
and the family and social configuration with which the infant
is presented by the Other. (The term Other refer to the infant’s
primitive environment, the mother or the mothering adult).
The function of the cut is to enable the constitution of the
subject through separation with the Other—we will come back
to this point in detail. This separation has a prerequisite: the
first sequence of the constitution of subjectivity, which Lacan
calls “alienation” (Lacan, 1998a). Upon meeting the Other, the
infant is exposed to language: in responding to his cries and
behavior, the Other names him, he refers to him. In this exchange,
the infant comes to realize that in order to become a subject,
he must use what Lacan calls signifiers (characteristic of the
symbolic order)—they are the discrete elements of language
considered as different sounds, independently of their usual
socially determined meaning. In particular, the infant gradually
sees that in order to interact with the Other, he must endorse
the signifier through which the Other designates him, called the
primary or master signifier (S1)—the future object of primary
repression. Lacan calls this operation ≪ alienation ≫ not only
because the infant, generally speaking, receives the discourse of
the Other through his speech, but most importantly because in
this encounter with the Other, he receives a specific signifier
S1, the assumption of which conditions his existence for the
Other, and in particular communication with him. The signifier
“functions as a signifier only by reducing the subject in question
to being no more than a signifier, to petrify him in the same
movement it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 207, mod. tr.).
The question then becomes, in order for the infant to become
a subject properly speaking, to know what he represents for the
Other, what the Other ≪ wants from him ≫ (Lacan, 2014)—
that is, what is the meaning of this S1 which designates him?
Since a single signifier, as such, has no meaning, S1 can only
acquire one by becoming part of a series of other signifiers
coming from the Other (Lacan calls S2 the ensemble of these
additional signifiers). In other words, alienation does not suffice
to constitute the subject because, far from enabling the infant to
gain access to a knowledge of what he is, it instead opens him to
a never-ending series of equivalences between S1 and S2. It is this
series of equivalences that enables the explorations of infantile
curiosity (Lacan, 1998a, part 3), and more generally accounts for
the effects ofmetaphor andmetonymy throughwhich formations
of the unconscious can be interpreted.
The Cut and the Desire of the Other
It is at this very point, in these “intervals which cuts between
the signifiers” S1 and S2 (Lacan, 1998a, p. 214, mod. tr.) that
the second part of the structuring effect of the signifier on the
subject comes to play: that is, the function of the cut. Endorsing
S1 opens a≪ Spaltung [splitting] in the subject≫ (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 63): he becomes cut, ≪ divided ≫ because the relationship
between S1 and S2, far from being immediately obvious (since
they both lack intrinsic meaning), only makes sense through
metaphorical and metonymical equivalences within a specific
network of signifiers which characterizes the constellation laid
out by the Other specific to every subject. The unconscious effect
of any S1 will thus depend, for each subject, on the S2 with which
it is paired.
Thus, the constitution of the subject requires the cut in
addition to alienation because the interval between S1 and S2, the
repressed primary signifier and its equivalents in the discourse
of the Other, draws on equivalences that are specific to the
discourse of every particular Other, the desire of whom is the key
to understand these equivalences. “It is in the interval between
these two signifiers that resides the desire offered to the mapping
of the subject of the discourse of the Other, of the first Other he
has to deal with, let us say, by way of illustration, the mother”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 218). Thus the cut enables the constitution of
the subject by leading the infant to wonder what the desire of the
maternal Other is, what she wants from him (this question drives
the analytic process, which will regressively lead to discover what
one’s S1 is, as well as the ultimately arbitrary, contingent nature
of its equivalences with S2). “It is in so far as [the subject’s] desire
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2177
Razon et al. The Lacanian Concept of Cut
is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at,
of what she brings out as meaning, it is in so far as his desire is
unknown, it is in this point of lack, that the desire of the subject
is constituted” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 218).
The Fort-Da: Separation as an Effect of the
Cut, and the Introduction of Object a
Lacan believed that the subject’s question about the desire
of the Other, located in the cut between signifiers, can be
paradigmatically illustrated by the sequence of the Freudian reel
play (the≪ fort-da≫). This sequence illustrates the dependence
of the subject’s being on the desire of the Other.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 2001, written in
1920), Freud describes how an 18-months infant—most likely
his grandson Ernst—symbolizes the absences of his mother by
playing with a reel attached to a string, thereby gradually enabling
the introjection of the absented parent. Upon throwing the reel
away from his cradle, he gives vent to a loud≪ o-o-o-o≫ (which
means “fort” [away] in German), before pulling it back into view
and hailing its appearance with a gleeful “Da !” (“There !”). In
analyzing the infant’s play, and in particular the substitution of
the reel to the absent mother, Freud insists on the psychical
achievement of becoming able to acknowledge her absence and
to withstand it, by figuratively becoming the agent of this absence
(in throwing the reel away).
But for Lacan, compensating for her absence by converting
passivity into activity is “of secondary importance” (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 62). He starts by pointing that the second step of the play
(the “da!”), by introducing a phonemic alternation, represents
the comings and goings through a pair of signifiers, S1 (“o-o-
o”) and S2 (“da!”). Thus, the fort-da play presents us with the
paradigmatic example of the effect of the cut (S1-S2 pair) on
the subject—that is, separation. The physical disappearance of
the maternal Other (endowed with a breast) can only become
meaningful for the subject insofar as, by drawing on the “o-o-
o/da!” pair, he is led to wonder what type of object he is in the
eye of this Other who keeps coming and going. In other terms,
it is the phonemic opposition that enables the infant to wonder
what takes place inbetween S1 and S2–which refer to absence
and presence. Therefore, in throwing the reel, the infant stages
this very question: the reel represents him as an object separated
from the body of the Other—Lacan calls it “object a,” a non-
empirical object which causes the desire of the Other once it
is separated from his body (Lacan, 2014). By thus staging the
Other separating from the object (reel-baby) and then coming
back to it, the infant understands the comings and goings of the
Other as manifestations of her desire, on which the infant draws
in order to and correspondingly become a desiring subject. For
in this sequence, he realizes that he lacks what the desire of the
Other can give him, namely the bodily part (especially the breast)
experienced as separated from him, which in turn becomes a
separated object a for him (Lacan, 1998a, p. 62). Thus the fort-
da play, which draws on the function of the cut in its simplest
expression (“o-o-o”/ “da!”), produces a separation by leading the
infant to wonder what object a he is to the Other and thereby to
develop a desire echoing that of the Other (ibid.).
The question then becomes to know what conditions, on the
side of the Other, the subject’s access to the function of the
cut, and the consecutive representation of a separation with the
Other and the corresponding loss of the object a. To address this
question, we start by examining the paradigmatic condition to
access the cut (the paternal metaphor), and the corresponding
version of the cut: castration.
The Paradigmatic Condition of the Cut on
the Side of the Other: The Paternal
Metaphor, and Its Absence
Since the function of the cut puts to work a relation of
metaphorical and metonymical substitution between S1 and S2,
the paradigmatic condition of its implementation in the infant’s
psyche is what Lacan calls the paternal metaphor (Lacan, 1966,
1998b,c). This concept, which refers to Lacan’s rewriting of the
Oedipus complex, helps specify an Oedipal mode of representing
oneself as separated from the Other and thereby as object a of
their desire.
The paternal metaphor is what enables the child to understand
the mother’s (or mothering figure’s) absence as an Oedipal
separation: this metaphor refers to the effect of the introduction,
by the Other, of a specific signifier called the Name-of-the-Father
(Lacan, 1966, p. 557). This signifier is meant to introduce the
infant to the symbolic operation of castration, which entails two
things. First, the Other’s desire also has another object, referred
to by this signifier (it can be the real father, but anyone can be
in this position); therefore, the infant doesn’t play the role of a
phallus, that is of an object fully satisfying the mother’s desire.
And second, the Other’s desire is nonetheless related to the infant,
since its object stands in a symbolic relation of filiation with
him. The presence of a Name-of-the-Father on the side of the
Maternal Other thus conditions the infant’s access to theOedipus,
and it plays a role even before the infant’s birth by largely
contributing to lay out the coordinates of his future subjective
structuration. For if the Name-of-the-Father is no guarantee
that the infant will be neurotic, it at least presents him with a
triangular configuration which can protect him from depending
exclusively on the desire of an almighty mother (with its potential
arbitrariness), thanks to the presence of another object of desire
on her part: her disappearance in the fort-da can be understood
by the infant as a manifestation of her desire for someone else.
Thus, insofar as the Name-of-the-Father indicates both that
the mother’s desire has another object and that this object is
nonetheless related to the infant, the presence of this signifier in
the Maternal Other enables the child’s primary identification to
the father: by making it possible for the infant to acknowledge the
presence of another object for the Mother’s desire, this signifier
enables him to becomes a representative of the Name-of-the-
Father (this is the positive side of symbolic castration for the
infant: while he is no longer the mother’s phallus, he becomes in
exchange a paternal representative). Thereby, the Name-of-the-
Father crucially determines the content of the infant’s S1, and
will thus help him investigate his origin in the Other, i.e., his
S2 (constitution of infantile sexual theories, and of the primal
scene fantasy). It thus becomes manifest that the function of the
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cut will paradigmatically rely on the paternal metaphor, and that
castration is therefore to be understood as the Oedipal version
of the cut: this metaphor will enable the subject to question the
Other’s desire with respect to him by establishing and binding the
gap between S1 and S2 through metaphorical and metonymical
equivalences, thereby grounding the discourse concerning the
origin of the infant in the desire of a parental couple (This does
not entail that the infant would access the Oedipal conflicts at
the time of the fort-da or other absence/presence-staging plays—
roughly around 18 months—, but that the infant’s experience of
the fort-da as an introduction to an Oedipal structure will largely
depend on the Oedipal structuration of the Other’s psyche).
Hence when the Maternal Other’s psyche presents the infant
with the paternal metaphor, the effect of the cut (the separation of
infant as object a from the mother) is, so to speak, compensated
for by the emergence of another bond between infant and Other:
by being acknowledged by the latter as a result of the encounter
between her desire and the Name-of-the-Father, the infant
becomes phallicized. That is, he is desirable as a representative
of her encounter with the Name-of-the-Father, and not only as
an object of her own desire. From this moment on, separation
also means conjunction: the infant hereafter exists as a subject
embedded in a symbolic lineage, and no longer as the sole object
of the mother’s desire—this phallicization is thus the symbolic
gain of the Oedipal version of the cut, to which castration refers.
Correspondingly, the Other’s lack of acknowledgment of
the Name-of-the-Father (and the consecutive lack of paternal
metaphor in the discourse transmitted to the infant) will lead
the mother to make him her sole object of desire. He becomes
a non-phallicized object a, which does not depend on the desire
of a couple—be it the psychical couple of the mother’s Oedipus
complex. In this configuration, the infant does not receive the
Oedipal discourse-mediated representations which could enable
him to access the function of the cut, and thereby separate himself
psychically from themother: her absence isn’t understood against
the background of an Oedipal triangulation, but as a definitive
loss, experienced by the infant as a fragmentation of his own
body (characteristic of psychotic anxiety). This type of psychical
organization is characteristic of psychosis: the subject as object
a doesn’t experience himself as separated from the Other’s body.
Lacan does not mean that a maternal Other who does not present
his infant with a the Name-of-the-Father is psychotic, since many
clinical configurations can prevent her from presenting a Name-
of-the-Father to the infant (depressive breakdown, temporary
depersonalization, effects of early mother-infant interactions in
the context of neuronal or bodily conditions, etc.). But the
subjective coordinates in which the infant is thus introduced are
psychotic-like, since the S1 through which the Other refers to him
isn’t paired with an S2 representing an Oedipal discourse about
his origin in the desire of a couple, giving him a specific, distinct
position by separating him from an almighty maternal Other.
How can an infant be introduced to the function of the cut
when he hasn’t initially been presented with the paradigmatic
symbolic condition of the cut—namely, the mother-transmitted
paternal metaphor? Before examining how Maud Mannoni
provided a theoretically and clinically original response to this
question (Part 3), we will examine some of the subjective effects
of the lack of anOedipal S2, in order to better understand both (1)
what a subject not heretofore exposed to the paternal metaphor
needs to access the function of the cut, and (2) what such a cut
would amount to.
The lack of Oedipal S2 can refer to a variety of specific
positions attributed to the subject as object a by the Other.
The first part of Maud Mannoni’s seminal contribution lies,
in the 1950s and 1960s, in the clinical exploration of one of
these subjective positions: namely, the one underlying what was
then called mental retardation, or deficiency (we will use this
terminology in spite of its connotations, as it was of common use
at that time). Lacan, who was her analyst and encouraged her to
publish her first book on the subject, underlined as early as in
the Seminar 11 that the great merit of her work was to shed light
on the “psychotic dimension” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 238) of mental
retardation. This dimension comes from the “reduction” of the
child to “being nomore than the support of her desire in the most
obscure term” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 237, mod. tr.): in the absence
of paternal metaphor, the retarded infant, child, or adolescent is
often caught up, as Mannoni phrased it, in the maternal fantasy.
We will now develop this point.
THE 1950S AND 1960S: FROM THE
RETARDED CHILD TO THE MATERNAL
FANTASY
Before expanding on the role of the maternal fantasy, we will
briefly recall the context of Mannoni’s encounter with Lacan.
He wanted her book to be the first in his newly inaugurated
collection “Le Champ Freudien” (The Freudian Field) because
it was showing, in the clinical domain of mental retardation—
heretofore quite neglected by psychoanalysts—the relevance of
the Lacanian function of the cut, by focusing on the effects of the
lack of an Oedipal cut (i.e., castration) on the constitution of the
subject.
Mannoni’s Encounter with Lacan: The
Psychotic Dimension of Mental
Retardation
Lacan noticed Mannoni’s work in the 1950s, by attending
conferences and reading papers mostly focused on psychoses,
about which Françoise Dolto (Lacan’s other famous child analyst
pupil) hadn’t done much work—focused as she was on the
vicissitudes of Oedipal configurations. He immediately suggested
that Mannoni undertake a cure with him; in parallel, an
uninterrupted clinical exchange began: “he would give me all of
his Seminars and I was ‘transformed’ by what he wrote” (Didier-
Weill, 2001, p. 174); “it was my clinical work he was interested
in. . . he would keep asking about it to know more” (Didier-Weill,
2001, p. 172).
In this first period of their interactions, he encouraged her
to share her clinical work on the unconscious family stakes of
mental retardation and psychosis: “with his support, I wrote in
one goThe Retarded child and theMother: a Psychoanalytic study”
(Mannoni, 1988, p. 42), published in 1964. Lacan chose this book
to open his newly established collection, “The Freudian Field” (Le
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Seuil editors); it would soon be completed by The First Meeting
with the Psychoanalyst (1965).
Looking back at what she wanted to show, she wrote:
“The child creates the psychotic response along with someone
else; the more he will feel his environment approves of the
seriousness of his ‘condition’, the more he will try and ‘adjust’ to
the character in which he chose to alienate himself. Raised in the
middle of an adult discourse focused solely on his case, the ‘ill
child’ has no other solution but to disappear as a subject in order
to fully become the illness with which he is equated” (Mannoni,
1970, p. 40).
Starting from the clinical hypothesis according to which “the
child’s unconscious is often to be sought after in the parent’s
unconscious” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 77), she notices that, in the
psychotherapeutic care of so-called retarded children, psychiatric
diagnosis can act as a screen with respect to the contribution
of the “psychotic dimension” (Lacan, 1998a, p. 238) of the
mothering parent’s unconscious to the child’s retardation. In
other words, this diagnosis can be used as a family defense—
with the other parent’s frequent tacit consent—to ward off the
question of whether the desire of the Other is aimed at a paternal
figure, and replace it with a dual mother-infant relationship:
the unconscious legitimization by the diagnosis prevents the
implementation of the function of the cut and its separating
effect. In this context, the child is cornered into adopting the
subjective coordinates he is thus being offered, by endorsing this
S1 which reduces him to the status of dependency characteristic
of mental retardation. The diagnosis qua S1 saturates the
coordinates of the child’s subjectivization possibilities: he remains
alienated within a psychotic-like system of coordinates devoid of
any symbolic cut which would enable the mother to view him as
a separated being, by relating him to the Name-of-the-Father.
“When the symptom [of retardation, in the psychiatric sense of
the word] has become the subject’s onlymeans of communication,
he holds onto it. It is his language, and he wants it to be
acknowledged as such” (Mannoni, 1998, p. 94).
This exchange with Lacan sheds light on Mannoni’s
characterization of her work in the 1950s and 1960s: “retardation
and psychosis are alike” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 84). This intuition
can be traced back to the clinical sensitivity derived from
Mannoni’s childhood experiences: her family reacted to the
bewilderment and sense of loss she experienced upon leaving her
beloved nurse in Sri Lanka (where her father was the consul of
Belgium) by calling her “the retard” (cf. Razon, 2012). Her own
subsequent personal trajectory, and her encounter with Lacan,
would lead her to elaborate a therapeutic perspective to escape
alienating family dynamics: helping retarded children to distance
themselves from the position in which they are kept by their
environment requires to investigate the psychotic dimension of
the parental unconscious, characterized by a lack of cut.
But elaborating a therapeutic perspective doesn’t mean that
she sought to establish a parental or maternal causality (and
thereby, responsibility) at the root of mental retardation—be it in
her theorizing or in her clinical work. She tried to shed light on
the dimensions of the family’s psychical dynamics which prevent
the child from developing as well as he can, and which can be
influenced through appropriate therapeutic work focused on the
establishment of a cut. She always refused to view the parents as
guilty of their child’s condition, as one of us (AV) has witnessed
on a constant basis during 15 years of work alongside her.
Correspondingly, she did not neglect the importance of
organic causality in accounting for the child’s condition: speaking
of a young patient, she writes that her retardation “seemed to have
an undeniable organic basis” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 50). She thus
remained faithful to Freud’s legacy: in the Preface of the Three
Essays, he draws on the notion of complemental series to stress
that the biological dimension of the symptom should always
be questioned, alongside the psychical. Therefore, Mannoni’s
view can be seen as belonging to what is nowadays called a
multi-factorial approach to mental disability (cf. Golse, 2013).
Mannoni, in pointing out the psychotic dimension of the
family unconscious, simply wished to claim that such an
organic causality does not preclude a psychotherapy based on
psychoanalytic principles—and that ignoring the unconscious
processes emerging in a family upon encountering a child who
resembles them so little will prevent his phallicization and
thereby prevent the establishment of the cut.
The Lack of Cut: The Retarded Child,
Caught Up in the Maternal Fantasy
Mannoni starts from the clinical observation according to which
the psychologically handicapped child generally encounters
a family configuration laden with a “psychotic dimension”
(Lacan, 1998a, p. 238), i.e., lacking a Name-of-the-Father: “the
handicapped child is rarely welcomed in a genuinely triangular
situation” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 32)—that is, acknowledged by the
mother as a representative of the father. Therefore, “the lack of a
paternal signifier reduces the child to the status of object, without
any hope of becoming a subject” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 52): if the
mother does not view her child as representing his father (lack of
Oedipal S2), he becomes a de-phallicized object a, not separated
by the cut from the maternal Other’s body.
The situation is partly related to the effect of the parents’
encounter with the psychical handicap of the child. Of course,
the extent of the parents’ Oedipal organization—and specifically
the mother’s—plays an important role in the development of the
handicapped child; but the effect of his handicap (as early as in
ultrasound scans, etc.—cf. Potier, 2009) considerably weakens
this organization, and increases the risk of de-phallicization. (The
exponential rise of genetic and genomic sequencing nowadays
makes this type of clinical configurations an everyday situation:
the effects of de-phallicization need to be prevented, in particular,
during the announcement consultation consecutive to genetic
testing—cf. Potier et al., 2016). In other words, according to
Mannoni, an important parental de-phallicization of the child,
consecutive to the lack of cut, often occurs even when parents
have a neurotic structure (cf. Vanier, 2012, p. 42–43). In these
cases, the impact of the handicap on the parental bond is so
deep that the mother doesn’t relate the child to her desire for the
father. It is this de-phallicization dynamics which Lacan aims to
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single out by using the expression “psychotic dimension” (Lacan,
1998a, p. 238): it does not refer to the specific psychical structure
of the mother (or the parents), but to the type of de-phallicized
configuration which frequently emerges in the context of a lack
of cut characteristic of psychical handicap.
Raymonde, 14 years old, meets Mannoni because of a
profound mental retardation and lack of motor coordination,
with a “seemingly undeniable organic basis” (Mannoni, 1981, p.
50 sq., as well as all quotes in this paragraph). She rapidly shows
a total lack of active resistance or aggressive behavior: everyone
is “nice.” All other siblings have a significant academic delay in
the absence of mental retardation—and the father is an academic.
Her mother is extremely rigid and anxious: she cannot stand
the children’s liveliness, which frightens her; all of them have
personality disorders. Raymonde’s mental retardation is a defense
against her mother’s rigid phobia: “she responds to her mother’s
demand to not cause any trouble by acting like a nice frightened
girl, willing to be forgotten.” The mother explains her severity
in potty training by saying “I don’t like it when I smell bad”—
anamnestic discussions clearly showed that, during pregnancy,
she felt as though Raymonde “was part of her own body,” just
like “one of her own organs.” This lack of the function of the
cut comes from the situation surrounding her pregnancy: the
father threatened to leave her in case the child was nonviable: this
anticipated lack of acknowledgment from the father, inducing
a massive de-phallicization, was assorted (for both parents)
with a family structure where each parent’s mother sought to
exclude their child’s partner. Therefore, their own psychical
triangulations were already weakened: the father let the mother
leave him aside, while she as well had little psychical space for
him. This family constellation thus prevented Raymonde from
accessing any kind of triangulation. Psychotherapy gradually led
to unearth an important persecutory dimension (with spirits
invading her body), echoing her mother’s hypochondria and her
experiences of bodily invasion. Working through these fantasies
helped her regain a grip on her mental functioning and her
body, which in turn led her to social and professional insertion
(she became a gardener working with children). On the other
hand, the gradual autonomization enabled by this psychoanalytic
process, led Raymonde’s mother to a massive disorganization and
delusional confusion (Mannoni, 1981) because of her inability
elaborate her object a’s absence.
In these cases, the desire upon which the child depends is
strictly the mother’s, “in its most obscure term” (Lacan, 1998a,
p. 237): the child is led to adopt the position conferred to him
by the maternal fantasy, whatever the latter’s precise nature—
while he can wonder what he represents as an object a for the
Other, he does experience the Other’s desire as de-phallicized.
This is what Mannoni refer to when she writes that in these
cases, “as soon as it was conceived, the subject already plays
a very specific role in the mother’s fantasy; his fate is already
sealed; he will be this desireless object whose sole function will
be to fill in the maternal emptiness” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 84).
This sentence plays on the word “conception”: when the child
was physically conceived, he didn’t have this status (his handicap
was unknown to the parents); but later parental unconscious
formations show that, after discovery of the handicap, his
conception was fantasmatically re-written into a completely de-
phallicized narrative, qualifying him as a non-phallicized object
a excluded from the couple’s desire. “Unbeknownst to him, the
child is so to speak ‘caught up’ in the mother’s desire. (. . . ) The
child’s illness will conceal the mother’s” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 87).
Being caught upmeans that it is themother’s difficulty to consider
separation (this is the “illness”) which often leads her to present
her child’s illness as the motive of an apparently legitimate care,
thereby putting him in the position of an extension of her own
body and thus precluding the cut from taking place.
Hereafter, this maternal “illness” (difficulty to consider
separation) will lead her to equate separation with losing one’s
own being: the function of mental retardation “is to hide not only
[the child’s] lack of being, but what is felt as the mother’s lack of
being” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 170). A mother tells Mannoni: “since
my child left, I feel an emptiness in myself, I don’t know what to
do with myself, I’m completely at a loss” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 101).
For the mother, opening this closed mother-child circuit means
self-annihilation: “any claim to autonomy on the part of the child
is immediately experienced by the mother as the disappearance
of this necessary support of her fantasy” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 86).
Correspondingly, the unconscious of the retarded child echoes
the mother’s emptiness anxiety: “Mother’s existence depends
on me alone” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 105). This reminds us of
the disorganizing effects of Raymonde’s autonomization on her
mother.
The fantasy refers to the coordinates of the relation to the
object, and the object refers to a part of the Other’s body, of which
the subject must separate himself in order to come to existence.
Therefore the term “emptiness” used by this mother can help
specify the maternal fantasy wherein the retarded child is caught
up: it is an archaic, cannibalistic oral fantasy, where the child-
object is being devoured by the mother. Since the child is in a
position of non-phallicized object, and is thus not protected from
this maternal fantasy by a paternal cut, he experiences this fantasy
directly in his body: he is afraid that the Other will snatch and
devour him.
“Retarded and psychotic children respond to the threat of the
Other with their body. Their body is directly subjected to panic:
they lack the symbolic dimension which would help them situate
themselves with respect to the Other’s desire without risking to be
snatched by him” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 198).
The cannibalistic fantasy of devouration had initially been
described by Karl Abraham (1916) in the context of the cure of
an adult patient; he mostly insisted on the fact that it expresses
the infant’s oral erotic drive. In the passage above, Mannoni—
after Lacan (and Melanie Klein, who was partly trained by
Abraham)—insists on the role of the Other in the structure of
the fantasy, for two reasons. Firstly, oral drive is, to a large extent,
experienced as coming from the Other because of the projective
nature of archaic fantasies. And second, the presence of an infant
does trigger cannibalistic fantasies in the Other: to some extent,
a phallicized infant is protected from the excessive staging or
transmission of such fantasies by the presence of the paternal
metaphor in the mother’s psyche—but in a de-phallicized context
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such as that ofmental retardation, where the infant is experienced
as part of her body, he is much less protected from them.
Mannoni points out, on the basis of such clinical material,
that this fantasy is prevalent in these children because of the lack
of what Lacan conceptualized as paternal cut. Our hypothesis
is that, in thus spelling out that this fantasy is at work in the
unconscious of mentally retarded children, Mannoni paved the
way for Lacan’s characterization of infantile symptoms in the late
1960s.
The First “Note on the Child” (1986):
Equating Lack of Cut with Alienation to
Maternal Fantasy
In 1964, in Seminar XI, Lacan gives, as the first example of
lack of cut, the “psychotic dimension” pointed out by Mannoni
in the unconscious of the retarded child caught up in the
maternal fantasy. In 1969, when writing the two “Notes on the
Child” (given to Jenny Aubry and published for the first time in
Aubry, 1983), Lacan draws on Mannoni to generalize her results.
From now on, he will describe the effect of a lack of cut in
the maternal unconscious (the “psychotic dimension”) with the
terms Mannoni used to spell out the family dynamics at work in
the background of mental retardation. From now on, the child
as object of the maternal fantasy will refer to a type of child
symptom, of which mental retardation becomes a specific case.
In the first “Note on the child,” Lacan distinguishes two
types of child symptoms, in the psychoanalytic sense of the
term—that is, two types of difficulties the child encounters in
order to become a subject. In the first case, the symptom can
represent the truth of the parental couple, i.e., the encounter of
their two Oedipus complexes. Drawing on the unconscious of
both parents, it is the most complex case; but it is more open
to psychoanalytical work as it relies on a cut—the Name-of-
the-Father is present in the mother’s unconscious, which thus
phallicizes the child. A typical example is Hans’ horse-phobia,
analyzed by Freud and later by Lacan (1998b): through this
phobia, he was working through and gradually integrating the
difference of sexes.
In the second case, this symptom is not mediated by
the paternal function, i.e., by the Name-of-the-Father: just as
with Raymonde’s defensive use of her mental retardation, the
symptom “stems from the subjectivity of the mother” (Lacan,
1986, p. 13–14), in which case the child is concerned “directly
as the correlative of a fantasy” (id.). The therapeutic goal then
becomes to help the child separate from this dual relationship
with the body of the maternal Other [Nowadays, we would most
likely use Lacan’s indications of two types of symptoms as a
spectrum, with being caught up in the maternal fantasy on one
end, and representing the truth of the parental couple on the
other; or alternatively, as two interacting axes which should both
be taken into account. Symptoms such as mental retardation
should actually be dealt with drawing on both axes; clinical work
with children with milder forms of mental retardation in the
context of microdeletion 22q11.2 has made one of us (OP) very
sensitive to the de-phallicisation caused by such symptoms. That
is, the parental couple, and the subsequent phallicization of the
child, can be partly put aside by the mother out of frustration at
not having given an ideal phallicized child to her Oedipal father;
which can profoundly impact the child’s symptoms, in reaction
to this disavowal of the importance of the couple].
Typical of this second case are psychosomatic disorders and
psychical configurations such as mental retardation—which,
for Mannoni, is essentially identical to child psychosis in its
structure. Psychosomatic disorders share with mental retardation
(and, more generally, psychosis) a lack of paternal metaphor, i.e.,
both belong to the “psychotic dimension” entailed in being the
direct correlative of a maternal fantasy. This doesn’t mean that
mental retardation is a psychosomatic disorder, but that initially
and prior to psychoanalytic work, psychosomatic symptoms are
devoid of symbolic meaning: they are characterized by their lack
of subjective signification and cannot be related metaphorically
to the Oedipal narrative (Lacan, 1998a); as such, they are distinct
from hysteric symptoms where bodily affections have an Oedipal
signification.
One cannot but be struck to find in Lacan’s words (“directly
as the correlative of a fantasy”) the exact characterization of the
child’s being the object of the maternal fantasy because of a lack
of cut which Mannoni, partly nourished by her interactions with
Lacan, had found in mental retardation when she wrote “the lack
of a paternal signifier reduces the child to the status of an object,
without any hope of becoming a subject” (Mannoni, 1981, p. 58).
Thus generalizing Mannoni’s formulation then allows Lacan
to spell out what is entailed in becoming the object of the sole
maternal fantasy, andmore specifically its de-phallicized object a:
insofar as the child isn’t separated from the mother by the Name-
of-the-Father, he “realizes the presence of what Jacques Lacan
designates as the object a in the fantasy” (Lacan, 1986, p. 13–
14)—that is, he appears to themother as the surrogate to anything
she could lack, i.e., she could have lost from the body of her own
maternal Other. From this perspective, the mother’s subjective
structure, determined by a specific “mode of lack” (neurotic,
perverse or psychotic), is secondary—the child will nonetheless
be put in the position to “saturate” it (Lacan, 1986, p. 13–14), and
thereby to conceal from her the truth of her own symptom. In
this conception, Lacan takes into account the family dynamics
pointed by Mannoni in the case of mental retardation: the child’s
symptom is the screen of the maternal symptom. Later, during
the RSI seminar (1974-1975, unpublished), Lacan will refer to
the mother’s relation to the child saturating her lack with the
expression “non-phallic jouissance.”
How can these indications, born from the exchanges between
Lacan and Mannoni, be put to work in order to make up for a
lack of introduction to the cut by the maternal Other through the
paternal metaphor—whether it has led to structures lacking this
metaphor (schizophrenic, autistic, etc.) or to severely neurotic
ones which somehow made up for this lack? And additionally,
what would be a type of cut different from castration, which could
be aimed at by psychoanalytic work with non-neurotic patients?
The first theoretico-clinical question was at the core
of Mannoni’s revolutionary institutional project: in the
late 1960s, she founded Bonneuil’s Experimental School.
Embodying the theoretico-clinical organization of the splintered
institution, this School also gave clinical elements toward
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answering the second question, by helping those of its non-
neurotic hosts develop specific types of cuts differing from
castration.
BONNEUIL’S SPLINTERED INSTITUTION:
ASSUMING THE CUT ON THE SIDE OF
THE OTHER
The Splintered Institution: Assuming the
Cut by Acknowledging Projects as S2
When the mothering Other’s unconscious hasn’t exposed the
child to the Name-of-the-Father, but has instead subjected him
to her sole fantasy, the Other’s comings and goings in the fort-
da cannot be understood by the child as manifesting a desire
for someone else. Confronted with a maternal unconscious
seeking to saturate her lack by reducing the child to the status
of non-phallic object a, the child experiences separation as
potential destruction of the Other – by fragmenting, exploding
or emptying her body (cf. the≪ emptiness≫ feeling mentioned
to Mannoni). Correspondingly, the infant identifies with this
experience and fears his own explosion once separated from the
other.
Clinical work with children not previously introduced to the
cut through the paternal metaphor will thus have to make them
feel that it is actually possible to separate from the maternal
Other without destroying her—and thus, without risking their
own life, for they are not part of her body. Insofar as their
type of transference is—at least initially—dual (staging a face-
to-face struggle with an almighty Other), Mannoni suggested
an institutional therapeutic setting in order to provide, in
material reality, a constant and permanent containment for their
anxieties. But in order to prevent the institution (with its constant
presence) from becoming the transferential replica of an almighty
Other about to devour her child-object in a dual relationship, and
instead to enable children to access the cut, she put forward a new
type of therapeutic institution: the splintered institution, which
assumes the cut and thereby makes separation possible on the
part of the child.
“An institution is like a person feeding off of those who depend on
her. It practically assumes an almighty position: it behaves likes
the mother of a psychotic child, from whom the subject cannot
separate without risking to explode. A different institution would,
much like a scale, assume the cut and thereby make it possible for
the subject to situate herself through his own speech—and to thus
separate himself, cut himself off of the institution (. . . ). The cut
becomes possible, exactly as with a mother and her child. The cut
is a symbolic phenomenon, which allows the subject to emerge
and be acknowledged as such by someone else” (Mannoni, 1976,
p. 53).
To prevent the establishment of a psychotic transference with
respect to the institution—which would equate separation with
mutual destruction—due to a lack of cut in the child’s psyche,
the strategy would be to take up any wish of the children for a
project outside the institution (trip, activity, etc.), and consider
it as an attempt at establishing a cut. “Assuming the cut,” as
Mannoni put it, means that any expression of such a project-
wish is to be “acknowledged” by the institution staff as a potential
S2, i.e., as a symbolic representation of the child as bearing
a different identity (taking-part-in-such-and-such-project) and
thereby as implementing the function of the cut in their psyche,
thus allowing them to withstand separation from the Other’s
body. By offering them the figure of a non-devouring maternal
Other, who can bear separation by deliberately cutting herself
from them in response to their project-wish, the institution re-
enacts the fort-dawith a different outcome: physical separation in
the course of the project doesn’t amount to mutual destruction,
as it is rather the implementation of the cut—i.e., the result of the
symbolic acknowledgment by the Other of a new identity for the
child, different from that of de-phallicized object a. Taking up the
child’s wish enables the institution to present him with a different
desire of the Other with respect to him, and to represent himself
as absent from him.
Mannoni proposes to call such an institution a “splintered
institution” (“institution éclatée,” in French—cf. e.g. Mannoni,
1973, p. 77): “splinter” explicitly refers to the psychotic fantasy
(characteristic of what Lacan called the “psychotic dimension”)
which identifies loss of a bodily part with explosion and
annihilation. By coining this expression, Mannoni wanted to
stress that it should be the task of the institution itself to take
up and overcome the Other’s annihilation anxiety associated
with loss of a bodily part, which children want to prevent by
remaining attached to their status of his de-phallicized objects
a, by responding positively to their expressed project-wishes
(symbolic acknowledgment of the cut) and showing them that
it can withstand their outcome (physical separation).
Mannoni’s project of a splintered institution, which would
“assume the cut,” quickly became the motto of the Experimental
School situated in Bonneuil-sur-Marne (just outside of Paris),
founded in 1969 by Maud Mannoni and Robert Lefort, both
students of Lacan’s, with a couple of educators, Rose-Marie
and Yves Guérin. The School is a place where children and
adolescents live and take classes adjusted to their capacities; it also
is a night shelter. Today, it is a daycare hospital and therapeutic
night foster home. Schooling is in small groups, and goes along
with creative activities supervised by educators; children do their
part in the maintenance and daily chores.
The School rapidly became what Mannoni theorized as the
splintered institution by considering the children’s speech as
wishes: far from being a technique, its organization revolves
around the fundamental psychoanalytic tenet to start from what
the subject says—that is, to always consider the person as a
subject, and what they say as a manifestation of their subjectivity
(see the section Conclusion below). The goal being to help
children bear separation, it is a negative therapy of sorts, the goal
of which is to constrain as little as possible. For example, in the
early 1970s, an educator suggested to one of the adolescents, upon
seeing his gift in bike repair, that he create a repair studio within
the institution. The response was that he’d much rather work
in a real bike repair shop (potential S2), outside the institution.
The adolescent’s refusal, embedded within his transference on the
educator, made it possible for him, first, to enact the rejection
of an unconscious almighty Other. By taking up the educator’s
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acknowledgment of his skills, he could then voice a true potential
S2, to which the institution had to respond by allowing him
to exist under this new identity; this gave a new meaning to
this presence in the institution, as a moment embedded within
his particular project. By acknowledging this new representation
of himself, the institution helped him implement the psychical
function of the cut and thus envision himself as physically
separated from the Other: the fort-da could be undergone
without anxiety of mutual annihilation.
“The Fort-Da play, this oscillation between a here and a there,
is introduced in Bonneuil every time a child’s stay involves
an alternation with moments spent somewhere else” (Mannoni,
1976, p. 73).
In this light, projects such as going abroad are particularly
interesting experiences: the immersion in a foreign language
deepens the inscription in a new potential S2, and allows for
another representation of the desire of the Other.
With respect to families, the institution’s whole clinical
challenge then became to prevent the closure dynamics which
can appear in response to the implementation of the cut in
the child’s psyche, because of the repetition compulsion which
prevents them from letting the child escape his alienation
to the Other’s almighty fantasy and thus access a potential
new S2. Mannoni has the following exchange with the mother
of a patient who cannot but try and thwart Bonneuil’s
dynamics:
“Julien’s mother [JM]: Brittany does wonders for Julien.
Maud Mannoni [MM]: Yes, but it is of crucial importance that
you do not settle here, or else we’ll have to find him another place
to escape the family. . .
JM: You think so ? I wanted to move here with his twin brother.
MM: We’ve been lucky enough to find a place Julien likes, where
he can enact his rejection of both his family and Bonneuil. It is
his own place, where his mother and brother are absent. This
is of the utmost symbolic importance; you’re about to rob him
of this.
JM: The host family had even agreed to accept his twin brother. . .
MM: You are inducing a potential failure, here. You know
too well that, when he’s with you, the situation escalates very
quickly.
JM: After fifteen minutes, he starts insulting me, while he’s normal
and composed with everyone else.
MM: And yet, it is this very hell that you seek to re-create.
JM: No, but why would he be normal with others and not with
me?
MM: Why hunt him down to the place where he feels at peace,
without his family?
JM: It’s not on purpose that I knock everything down. I just can’t
help it” (Mannoni, 1976, p. 225).
Mannoni firmly tries to hold the symbolic function of the
cut (by stressing that the project is Julien’s own), in order
to protect both mother and child from the sado-masochistic
dual relationship which re-emerges when they are together.
Mannoni expands on this symbolic function by stressing that
the movement is to be understood as a variation of frames
(a direct reference to the transferential setting), i.e., as a
symbolic oscillation.
“To offer another place is to build an alternative to the logics of
rejection, to escape the deadlock of the inside-outside opposition
with respect to the family or the institution, by favoring a
movement between different places. By playing with different
frames, we re-introduce a movement within the inside-outside
opposition, and the subject can gradually reflect upon what he
wants to become” (Mannoni, 1986, p. 106).
Distanced from the S1 of his illness which feeds the fantasy
of a devouring Other on which the child depends, the S2
acknowledged by the institution represents a discourse which can
make up for the initial lack of paternal metaphor and implement
a cut, thus leading the child or adolescent to withstand physical
separation.
Varieties of Cut
The goal of the splintered institution is thus to make up
for the initial lack of paternal metaphor, and subsequently of
castration—the type of cut consecutive to this metaphor. But
this doesn’t mean that castration is the only type of cut that this
type of institution sets out to enable by acknowledging children’s
projects. A potential S2, being implemented as a function of the
cut through institutional support will not necessarily amount to
an Oedipal narrative; to that effect, the subject would need to
be in the coordinates of a mostly neurotic structuration. This
narrative is but one type of S2 enabling the cut by representing
the subject qua the object that the Other lacks, i.e., is separated
from—and therefore desires. It is one way to symbolically
account for the subject’s physical separation from the Other—
by drawing on triangulation, i.e., the presence of someone else
as object of desire. As mentioned earlier, castration accounts for
this specific type of cut because it binds the subject to the desire
of the couple constituted by the Other and the bearer of the
Name-of-the-Father.
In the splintered institution, the type of cut will depend
on the psychical structure of each subject: an attempt as
symbolically representing separation can use other means, such
as delusion—a highly symbolic production. One need only
think of Schreber’s delusional narrative (Freud, 1958), structured
around the fantasy of becoming God’s wife (S2), the object that
the He needs to become complete. The cut from the Other that
Schreber gradually elaborates is not symbolic castration, but it is
nonetheless an attempt at building an alternative to the fantasy of
being annihilated by an almighty Other, through becoming the
phallicized object that He needs (and thus cannot annihilate).
To give an example of alternate type of cut encountered at
Bonneuil (collected and synthesized by AV, a close collaborator
of Mannoni’s), work with autistic children revolved around
helping them realize that their project, acknowledged as S2 by the
team, involved physical separation—which, in autism, amounts
to death by annihilation, and is thus to be avoided at all costs. In
other words, the focus of the function of the cut to be enabled by
the institution was the acknowledgment of physical separation
as such; it is the earliest type of cut being staged in the fort-da,
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prior to any narrative accounting for it. Taking up their wishes
to go outside for various projects was successful in psychically
implementing the cut when, upon coming back to Bonneuil from
the countryside, they suddenly cried upon realizing that they had
left behind their “family.” Representing themselves as separated
from them, that is as having been lost by them, could be used
as a shifting point to be drawn upon in the gradual working
through of physical separation at stake in the fort-da—which is
quite different from the neurotic cut qua symbolic castration,
mostly revolving around elaborating Oedipal issues.
CONCLUSION
We tried to show the fruitfulness of Lacan’s concept of cut by
addressing it from the perspective of the psychical configurations
where it hasn’t been implemented (with the child being put
in the position of a de-phallicized object a). Maud Mannoni
has explored these configurations extensively: therefore our goal
was, in part 2 supra, to show how she has characterized some
of them, which then helped Lacan define them in a systematic
fashion. Finally, we wanted to lay out how Mannoni delineated a
theoretico-clinical setting aimed at making up for a lack of cut, as
defined by Lacan, and enabling it when subjectively possible (part
3 supra).
Mannoni’s original use of this concept of cut in the
splintered institution has been extended in an original fashion
by one of us (AV) in the context of a hospital work with
psychotic mothers and their infant; this led him to the idea
of a “supposition of subject” (Vanier, 1989). The gist of it
is that, in the presence of a psychotic type of mothering,
the neonate’s psychical development (and indeed, his effective
survival) will compensate the mother’s tendency to consider
him as part of her body, by assuming the function of the
cut and acknowledging him as a subject from the start—
that is, as someone with a potential to be embedded in
various S2.
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